Mao Zedong’s decision not to immediately pursue the annexation of Taiwan during his rule, despite the fact that the island was considered a part of China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was indeed a pragmatic one. Several factors—military, diplomatic, and internal—played a role in shaping this decision and making it more strategically advantageous for Mao to refrain from an all-out invasion of Taiwan for much of his rule.
First, from a military standpoint, China’s armed forces were not fully prepared to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan in the years immediately following the Chinese Civil War. While the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had achieved victory on the mainland in 1949, it faced significant challenges in terms of naval and air power. Taiwan was well-defended, with the Republic of China (ROC) forces entrenched under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, supported by the United States, which had made clear its commitment to defend Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. The PLA lacked the amphibious capabilities and the necessary logistics to mount a large-scale invasion across the Taiwan Strait, which made the prospect of annexation in the 1950s a difficult and potentially disastrous undertaking.
Diplomatically, the international situation was also a concern for Mao. At the time, the Cold War was intensifying, and the United States was heavily involved in defending its global interests, including its commitment to the ROC government in Taiwan. Mao knew that an attempt to annex Taiwan could provoke direct military intervention from the U.S., something that would have been detrimental to China’s larger geopolitical goals.
Internally, Mao's focus was on consolidating power on the mainland and managing the enormous challenges of rebuilding China, which included land reforms, industrialization, and overcoming famine. At this time, domestic stability and economic recovery were top priorities for the CCP, which made the idea of an expensive, drawn-out military conflict over Taiwan less appealing.
In conclusion, Mao’s decision to avoid annexing Taiwan during the early years of his rule can be considered pragmatic. The risks posed by military and diplomatic opposition, along with internal challenges, made an immediate invasion of Taiwan a complex and potentially destabilizing decision that Mao wisely chose to delay.